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Abstract.  The decentralized administrative controlled-nature of mobile ad hoc     
networks (MANETs) presents security vulnerabilities which can lead to attacks such as 
malicious modification of packets. To enhance security in MANETs, Trust and Reputation 
Management systems (TRM) have been developed to serve as measures in mitigating 
threats arising from unusual behaviours of nodes. In this paper we propose a candour-based 
trust and reputation system which measures and models reputation and trust propagation in 
MANETs. In the proposed model Dirichlet Probability Distribution is employed in 
modelling the individual reputation of nodes and the trust of each node is computed based 
on the node’s actual network performance and the quality of the recommendations it gives 
about other nodes. Cooperative nodes in our model will be rewarded for expanding their 
energy in forwarding packets for other nodes or for disseminating genuine recommenda-
tions. Uncooperative nodes are isolated and denied the available network resources. We 
employed the Ruffle algorithm which will ensure that cooperative nodes are allowed to 
activate sleep mode when their service is not required in forwarding packets for its 
neighbouring trustworthy nodes. The proposed TRM system enshrines fairness in its mode 
of operation as well as creating an enabling environment free from bias. It will also ensure a 
connected and capacity preserving network of trustworthy nodes.         
1 Introduction 
          Unstructured networks are networks with a decentralized control of operations. Such 
networks lack centralized infrastructure and administration. Mobile ad hoc networks 
(MANETs) are unique examples of unstructured networks. MANETs are characterized by 
limited bandwidth and are less efficient unlike wireless networks with a centralized 
administration. Typically, a MANET is prone to eavesdropping, high security threats, rapid 
and continuous changes in network topologies due to nodes mobility [1]. Due to these 
distinguished features, all network nodes in a MANET must act as a router, server and 
client [2], mandating these nodes to collaborate for the effective and efficient operations of 
the network.  Specialised network protocols have been employed in network layer of nodes 
in MANETs to ensure cooperation among nodes. Moreover, it is usually assumed that all 
the network nodes will act in accordance to the application and protocol specifications. 
However, due to limited resources or anomalous behaviours of some nodes, these 
assumptions are not always true. Network nodes sometimes make local decisions on 
whether to follow the network basic operations or not. These nodes may decide to act either 
selfishly by not forwarding packets or maliciously by advertising false routes [3]. Such an 
abrupt change in a node’s behaviour may result in reduced network efficiency and 
increased susceptibility to attacks. Therefore, a trust management system that ensures an 
effective and reliable collaboration of all network nodes in a MANET is essential. These 
systems would ensure that network nodes build a good reputation and attain a certain level 
of trust before such nodes can effectively operate in a network. As a result, there would be 
a significant reduction or elimination of malicious nodes trying to disrupt the operations of 
the network. Therefore, this would ensure that legitimate network nodes attain the required 
goals [3]. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces literature about 
trust and reputation systems in MANETs. In section 3, the concept of the proposed 
candour-based system is explained. Section 4 concludes the benefits of the proposed 
system and outlines future work. 
2 Literature Survey   
Over the past decade, a lot of research works have been proposed and carried out on 
TRM systems in mobile ad hoc networks which employed Price-based and Reputation-
based schemes to enforce cooperation among nodes in the network. The Price-based 
schemes [4-9] treat packet forwarding as a service which can be paid for and they introduce 
a form virtual currency to regulate packet-forwarding collaboration among nodes. Most of 
the price-based schemes require tamperproof hardware [4], [5] or virtual banks that all the 
nodes in the network can trust [6], [7]. These price-based schemes use the virtual currency 
as a form of reward to nodes that participate in packet forwarding activities.  In the case 
where a trust authority or virtual bank is required, it requires assistance from a fixed 
communication infrastructure to implement the reward schemes, which is not applicable for 
a pure ad hoc network.  
On the other hand reputation-based schemes [10-23] employ different monitoring 
techniques in gathering data which are used in computing the reputation and trust of nodes 
in the networks. The monitored data can be derived from direct observations of nodes 
activities or from recommendations from other nodes. These reputation-based systems are 
geared towards punishing and isolating selfish or malicious nodes in the network by 
denying these uncooperative nodes the available network resources. The cooperative nodes 
are allowed to carry on with their normal network activities which are perceived as a 
reward by these systems as long as they continue to forward packets for other nodes.  For 
example, He at al [15] proposed a secure and objective reputation-based incentive scheme 
for MANETs. The reputation of nodes in their proposed model is quantified by objective 
measures, and the propagation of reputation is efficiently secured by one-way-hash-chain 
based authentication. Their model uses punishment as a way of encouraging packet 
forwarding and discipline selfish nodes by probabilistically dropping packets that 
originates from those nodes. 
Most of the existing reputation-based schemes suffer from lack of effective mecha-
nisms to measure and propagate reputation and trust in the network.  Secondly, the 
cooperative nodes in these reputation-based schemes are not truly rewarded for continuous-
ly expending energy in routing or forwarding packets. The continuous unrewarded 
cooperation results in low energy levels in these cooperative nodes. This may in turn have 
an adverse effect on their trust, reputation as well as individual network performance. As a 
result, such nodes may end up being punished and isolated from the network when 
attempting to route or forward packets again. Therefore there is need for a reliable trust and 
reputation management system that would enforce cooperation by ensuring that collabora-
tive nodes are rewarded for conducting favourable network operations, while selfish and 
malicious nodes are punished and isolated from the network. Hence, a Trust and Reputa-
tion Management system that incorporates punitive and incentive measures in its mecha-
nism will ensure a fair platform for all the nodes in the network. In this paper we proposed 
a candour-based trust and reputation management system. This candour-based TRM 
system enshrines fairness in its mode of operation. Furthermore, it creates an unbiased 
enabling environment, which ensures that nodes are rewarded, isolated or punished based 
on the individual network behaviours of the nodes. Nodes in the proposed system are given 
incentive for expending their energy in forwarding packets for other nodes and for 
disseminating genuine second-hand reports. Our proposed TRM system considers that 
nodes have limited energy. Its functions cater for situations that will hamper an active 
nodes performance level due to low energy. It considers the fact that genuine nodes which 
are unable to forward packets due to low energy may still provide accurate recommenda-
tions. These recommendations usually require low amount of energy to action.         
3 The Candour-Based TRM System     
Fig. 1 shows the overview of the proposed candour-based TRM system. The 
following subsections explain the various module of the system. 
 
 
 
 
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                Fig. 1.  The schematic diagram of the candour-based TRM system 
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3.1 The Monitor Module 
The monitoring module comprises entirely of the monitor which is an essential part 
of the proposed TRM system. It specializes in detecting and reporting successful and 
unsuccessful packet forwarding activities and malicious modification of packets. It 
also ensures that nodes are not unfairly penalized for unintentionally dropping packets 
whereas the actual cause may be due to packet collision. To ensure the viability of the 
proposed monitoring process that will be carried out by the monitor, the monitor will 
only observe the activities of nodes that are 1-hop away, and each node will have the 
ability to carry out Omni-directional transmission. The monitor incorporates the pack-
et acknowledgements and packet precision techniques in its mode of operations.  It 
captures packets through listening of transmissions in promiscuous mode. Through 
monitoring of passive acknowledgements and the packet precision method, a node 
will be able to determine if its next hop neighbour is exhibiting any of the following 
behaviours; 
i. Carrying out a packet modification attack if the data contents have been dis-
honestly modified 
ii. Effectuating latency delays by retarding the retransmission of packets 
iii. Displaying a selfish behaviour by not forwarding a packet 
iv. Carrying out a prevarication attack if  a self-induced fallacious packet is 
transmitted 
v. Acting like a black hole if the packet intended for forwarding is not retrans-
mitted or dumped.  
vi. Launching an impersonation attack if the IP addresses or the MAC addresses 
have been spoofed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
                      Fig. 2.    The Internal structure of the Monitor 
 
The monitor detects, investigates and registers abnormal behaviours of nodes and 
passes the direct observations and recommendations to the reputation and trust mod-
ules for evaluation and computation. The next section will explain how this will be 
carried out. 
3.2            Reputation Computation 
    Nodes continuously observe the behaviours of their neighbours that are 1-hop away 
and compute a reputation value for the successful observations carried out. The repu-
tation of nodes in the network is computed using the Dirichlet Probability Distribu-
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tion. The Dirichlet Probability Distribution was chosen over other distributions be-
cause it provides a sound and flexible platform suitable for designing a practical repu-
tation system [24]. Dirichlet Distribution is able to differentiate a very large amount 
of negative reports from large positive reports.  It is also useful in implementing repu-
tation reports with grade levels, i.e. very bad – bad – uncertain – good – very good. 
This will enable nodes in the proposed TRM system to evaluate and decides which 
recommendation to integrate in computing the total aggregated reputation of a node in 
the network.  The Dirichlet Probability Density Function (PDF) for a set of possible 
outcomes and for positive real parameters can be defined as [24, 25]: 
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Where  ̃ represents the set of possible outcomes given by  
 
                                        ̃ = { (   )|1     }                                                          (2) 
 
such that   (  ) may represents the probability of forwarding packets,      (  ) may 
represents the probability of dropped packets and  (  ) may represents the probabil-
ity of maliciously modified packets. 
 ̃ represents a set of positive real parameters such that  
 
                                      ̃ = {   |1         }                                                             (3) 
 
The parameter    can be interpreted as the prior observation counts of the possible 
outcomes such that      may represents the number of successfully observed packet 
forwarding,        represents the number of successfully observed packet dropping 
and     may represents the number of successfully observed malicious modification 
of packets. 
The reputation of a node in the network , can be determined by the probability 
expectation of the Dirichlet Distribution given by the equation below [24, 25]: 
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      can be interpreted as prior observation counts for the possible outcomes of the 
observed events out of a k possible events. C is the cardinality of the state space over 
which a uniform distribution is assumed.     = (   ............  ) represents the accumu-
lated evidence over the observed elements of the state space and    is the base rate 
parameter over the state space. In case where no evidence is available, the base rate 
alone determines the probability distribution of the events. (e.g. the case of new nodes 
in the network) [24, 25]. As more evidence becomes available as a result of              
observations, the influence of the base rate diminishes; it reaches a point where the 
evidence alone determines the probability distribution of the events. 
 
3.2.1          Evaluation of Recommendations from Neighbouring Nodes 
Nodes rely on the recommendations from its neighbours in evaluating the total reputa-
tion value of a node. To avoid the effect of false second-hand reports affecting the 
reputation value, a deviation test will be carried out to determine the validity of the 
recommendation. The result of the deviation test will affect the reputation and trust 
value of the recommending node positively or negatively. This is similar to the work 
carried out in [17, 23]. For instance, if the reputation value of a node A on a subject 
node B is given as    and the recommendations of node B from node C is given as 
  , the deviation test can be evaluated using difference in the expectation value of the 
Dirichlet Probability Distribution.  Let   be the deviation for the test; 
 
               { ( (  )       )   }    { ( (  )       )   }                                    ( )  
 
Where   ( (  )       )        ( (  )       )  are the expectation values of 
         respectively.   is always positive and acts as the threshold validating rec-
ommendations from other nodes. 
 
3.2.2     Aggregating Direct Observations and Recommendations 
To compute total reputation of node A about a subject node B after a certain period 
i.e. t + 1, the reputation derived from direct observations and the recommendations 
from other nodes are aggregated to give a final reputation value. This implies that the 
total aggregated reputation of node A about node B is given by; 
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Where   ⃑ (   )  is the sum of all the recommendations from node A 1-hop neighbours 
about node B during a given period t+1.   ( )  is the current reputation value.   is the 
decaying factor which controls the rate at which old reputation value decays after a 
given period, and it’s such that    [0, 1].  is a small positive weight which acts as a 
discount factor. After n periods of time, the total aggregated reputation of node A 
about node B can be given as; 
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3.3 Trust Evaluation 
 
The Trust evaluation of a node in the network is a combination of the aggregated 
reputation value and the accuracy of the node’s recommendations about other nodes. 
It is denoted as T 〈   〉 which is a combination of two factors.   denotes the trust-
worthiness of the node based on is the reputation as calculated in 8 which represents 
the node’s actual network operations, while   will denote the trustworthiness based 
on the accuracy of the recommendations a node makes about other nodes. 
 
3.3.1 Computation of Accurate Recommendations 
The accuracy value of the recommendations made by a node denoted as χ, can be 
defined as follows                                       
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Where   is the cumulative number of recommendations that are correct and   is the 
cumulative number of recommendations that are incorrect. A value of χ = 1 indicates 
absolute accuracy, and a value of χ close to zero indicates low accuracy. 
The confidence value, ϱ associated with the accuracy value χ is defined as [20]; 
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A value of ϱ close to 1 indicates high confidence in the preciseness of the computed 
accuracy value, while a value of ϱ close to 0 indicates low confidence in the comput-
ed accuracy value. The trustworthiness of a node based on the accuracy of its recom-
mendations about other nodes can be given as a pair of the accuracy value, χ and the 
confidence value, ϱ, which is similar to the notion of trust evaluation of nodes based 
on packet forwarding activities applied in  [19,20]. 
The trustworthiness evaluation associated with the pair (χ, ϱ) can be defined as; 
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where m and n are parameters that determine the relative importance of the accuracy 
value and the confidence value. 
 
3.3.2 Total Trustworthiness of a Node 
The total trustworthiness of a node is computed by combining the trustworthiness 
based on the reputation of the node in terms of what it does .i.e. forwarding packets, 
and in terms of the accuracy of its recommendation as defined in equation (10). 
This implies that the total trustworthiness, T 〈   (   )〉  can be given as; 
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3.4 The Reward and Punishment Scheme 
The reward and punishment scheme ensures that collaborating nodes are rewarded 
for effectively carrying out network operations, while selfish and malicious node will 
be denied network resources and isolated from the network.  After the reputation and 
trust of a node in the network has been computed, nodes that are found to have trust 
and reputation values below the given threshold value are classified to be untrustwor-
thy, while the nodes that have trust and reputation values that are above the threshold 
value are classified as trustworthy nodes in terms of their actual network activities and 
in terms of their recommendations about other nodes.  The computed trust and reputa-
tion values of nodes are stored in a trust table. These values are periodically updated 
when new values are computed from newly accumulated observations.  The Path 
Coordinator is responsible for isolating and denying misbehaving (untrustworthy) 
nodes the available network resources. It accesses the trust table before making a 
routing decision to ensure that untrustworthy nodes are eliminated from the routing 
paths. It also ensures that any packets that originate from those untrustworthy nodes 
are rejected. This ensures that only paths with trustworthy nodes are used for routing 
or forwarding packets. On the other hand, the reward scheme ensures that nodes that 
are found trustworthy are able to activate an idle period. It works with the observation 
that when a region of  the network has a sufficient density of trustworthy nodes, only 
a small number of the nodes needs to be on at any time to forward traffic for active 
connections. The reward scheme decision is based on an estimation of how many of 
its trusted neighbours will benefit from it being awake, and the amount of energy 
available to it. The scheme employs a Ruffle algorithm [26] which ensures minimum 
power assignment for each trustworthy node such that symmetric connectivity is pre-
served.  
For instance given a region of trustworthy nodes Tn = (W,E,c) with maximum 
power assigned to each node. The Ruffle algorithm aims to find a minimum power 
assignment for each of the trustworthy nodes in the network such that the symmetric 
connectivity in Tn is preserved while packet forwarding and routing remains effective 
and efficient.  The algorithm is as follows; 
 Assign to each of the trustworthy node an ID based on the energy level. This       
information is gotten from the energy module. 
 The trustworthy nodes are then sorted by their ID. 
 For each trustworthy node Wi(i = 1, n), find the number of connected trustworthy 
nodes in its neighbourhood. This information can be derived from the path coordi-
nator. 
 Find the distance to the closest trustworthy node that has an ID great than the ID 
of  Wi  for each connected trustworthy nodes to Wi. 
 Find the distance Sd = distance of the furthest of all the closest trustworthy nodes. 
 Reduce the range of Wi to Sd. 
The Ruffle algorithm also aims to reduce energy consumption on sending packets for 
trustworthy nodes which are wake up.  With the successful implementation of the 
Ruffle algorithm, the reward scheme will ensure a connected and capacity preserving 
network of trustworthy nodes. 
4 Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper proposes a candour-based trust and reputation management system for 
mobile ad hoc network which will ensure that selfish and malicious nodes are      
eliminated and denied network resources while the trustworthy nodes are rewarded 
for forwarding packets. The proposed system will employ a reward scheme that   
allows trustworthy nodes to randomly activate idle time when their service is not re-
quired. This will preserve their energy and in turn prolong the life span of the network 
of trustworthy nodes.  Future work comprises of the full implementation of the     
proposed model using C++ and NS 2.34, evaluating the effectiveness of the          
implemented model in detecting misbehaving nodes and rewarding trustworthy nodes. 
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